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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Panel invites us to contemplate what “complete justice” would 
look like in the face of a disaster.  Because justice has many dimensions, 
the exercise is a difficult one.  When one thinks of justice being done in 
the aftermath of a catastrophe such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
the natural focus is on compensatory justice.  But compensatory justice 
is itself complex.  What it takes to achieve compensatory justice depends 
in part on whether one thinks about compensation in terms of 
distributive justice or responsibility-based justice.  Moreover, schemes 
of compensatory justice must also be assessed against criteria of 
procedural justice.  And standing apart from, but on par with, 
compensatory justice are at least two other conceptions of justice:  what 
I will call justice as accountability and comparative justice. 
In light of the many facets of justice, the ideal of “complete 
justice”—i.e., the doing of justice along each of its dimensions—may be 
unattainable.  I don’t mean this to be a strongly skeptical conclusion.  
Justice can and should be done.  Instead, my point is that, in the wake of 
a disaster, the doing of justice may require compromises among 
competing metrics of justice.    
 
∗ Professor, Harvard Law School.  What follows is an edited version of comments given at the 
panel of the AALS Section on Remedies at the AALS annual meeting in January, 2011.  I am 
grateful to the Section for inviting me to participate.  By way of disclosure, I note that I served as a 
consultant to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and in that capacity prepared a report on liability for 
economic loss under federal and state law.  See John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in 
Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 335 app. (2011). 
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II. COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 
The core idea of compensatory justice is simple enough.  Justice for 
disaster victims means, among other things, that they should receive 
compensation for their disaster-related losses.  But lurking within this 
idea are several questions:  (1) to whom is compensation owed?; (2) how 
much compensation is owed?; (3) from whom is compensation owing?; 
(4) how much compensation is owing?   
As to the first question, it seems unlikely that any conception of 
compensatory justice requires compensation for everyone who suffers a 
loss because of a disaster, no matter how remote or haphazard the 
connection.  Imagine (plausibly, in my view) a person who experiences 
insomnia because he is haunted by constant exposure to “spillcam” 
images of oil gushing from the Deepwater Horizon well.1  As a result, he 
repeatedly nods off at work and is fired.  As a matter of justice, is he 
owed compensation?  What about a yacht club that loses dues when, in 
response to BP chief executive Tony Hayward’s public relations gaffes,2 
BP executives are instructed by management not to renew their club 
memberships? 
One’s answer to the “to whom” question—and the other questions 
noted above—will depend in part on whether one is addressing 
compensatory justice as an issue of distributive justice or responsibility-
based justice.3  From the perspective of distributive justice, the questions 
might be answered roughly as follows.  Compensation is owed to 
anyone who has suffered dislocation because of a disaster beyond some 
baseline level of dislocation that people are expected to endure as part of 
life’s ordinary vicissitudes.  Compensation should be provided in 
amounts sufficient to get victims back on their feet.4  (The notion of 
“making whole” does not sit comfortably with distributive justice.  I 
suspect that few would suppose that disaster relief should fully 
compensate victims for their pain and suffering.)  Compensation is 
 
 1. See Hank Stuever, BP’s Oil Spillcam:  A Horror Movie About the Gulf That’s Deeply 
Compelling, WASHINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052505047.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 2. Liz Robbins, BP Chief Draws Outrage for Attending Yacht Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2010, at A20.  
 3. See John C. P. Goldberg, Comment, Misconduct, Misfortune and Just Compensation, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2042-44 (1997) (contrasting disaster relief provided in the name of 
distributive justice with compensation provided as corrective justice). 
 4. See id. at 2057-59; Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Mass Toxic 
Harm Cases:  A Comment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1995) (arguing that, in the face of 
limited resources, when tragedy occurs, compensation should be limited to what is needed for 
“survival and rehabilitation”). 
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owing from all fellow citizens who can afford to make a contribution.5  
(Some might even say that the obligation to contribute to relief efforts is 
owing from all those in the world who are better off materially than the 
victims.)  Individuals’ contributions should be modest, with each 
contributor paying a small amount to help spread the losses experienced 
in a concentrated form by disaster victims. 
Now, look at the question of compensatory justice from a 
responsibility-based perspective.  To whom is compensation owed?  It is 
owed to all those who can point to another person or entity and say, 
roughly, “my misfortune is not just a misfortune, it is a victimization—it 
is the result of your having breached a duty that you owed me.”  Notice 
that, depending on the source and scope of the alleged duty, the class of 
persons to whom compensation is owed as a matter of responsibility 
might be much narrower than the class that is owed compensation as a 
matter of distributive justice.  A person can be the victim of a disaster 
without having to establish that she was wronged by another person.  On 
a responsibility-based conception of compensatory justice, how much 
compensation is owed?  American lawyers tend to think in terms of a 
notion of restoration, of making whole.6  From whom is compensation 
owing?  Because the focus is on responsibility, there may be only one or 
a few persons or entities with a justice-based obligation to compensate.  
How much compensation is owing?  This will depend on how many 
parties are responsible for a given loss, and on principles of fair 
allocation as among them.7    
III.  PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Ordinarily, justice doesn’t just happen.  Rather, justice must be 
done.  And there is justice in how justice gets done—procedural justice.  
With respect to the doing of compensatory justice, procedural justice 
requires that those with claims to compensation have a way of asserting 
claims that is efficacious and not unduly burdensome.8  Moreover, 
 
 5. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 2044. 
 6. John C. P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 1269 
n.110 (2008) (citing 4 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR. THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 
494 (2d ed. 1986)). 
 7. For example, one might apportion liability among multiple responsible parties on a pro 
rata basis, or on the basis of percentages corresponding to each party’s relative degree of fault or 
culpability.  In addition, one would have to consider how to allocate, as among victims and 
responsible parties, the share of liability assigned to any responsible parties who are unreachable or 
judgment-proof.  
 8. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 237 (2004) (discussing 
different conceptions of procedural justice). 
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because there are often uncertainties that will need to be resolved to 
determine whether or what a claimant is owed, there must be an 
adequate set of procedures for dealing with open questions.  In short, 
there is a need for procedures that allow claims to be finally and fairly 
resolved, whether by authoritative order or by voluntary agreement. 
Some scholars, perhaps most prominently Professor Linda 
Mullenix, have expressed serious concerns about the compliance of 
institutions such as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) with the 
demands of procedural justice.9  I won’t take a stance on these issues.  
Rather, I want to note how some distinctions I have mentioned already 
are intertwined with them.  In particular, it is important to emphasize 
that the distinct conceptions of compensatory justice I mentioned 
above—distributive and responsibility-based—may require different 
procedures.  The resolution of claims for disaster relief perhaps are best 
achieved by a process that is cookie-cutter and fast, so those in need get 
at least some relief quickly.  The resolution of claims for responsibility-
based compensatory justice, precisely because they involve claims of 
wrongdoing and responsibility, will require a more fulsome process to 
ensure that the claimant really is a victim and that the person against 
whom a claim is made really is a responsible party.  It might even be the 
case that procedural justice requires a two-track or hybrid procedural 
system that is responsive to both the distributive and responsibility-
based aspects of compensatory justice.  In other words, to achieve 
procedural justice, we may need a system that allows victims prompt 
access to emergency need-based payments so that (in conjunction with 
litigation finance arrangements such as contingent fees) their efforts to 
pursue responsibility-based claims for compensation are not undermined 
by financial desperation.10   
What counts as procedural justice will also depend in part on the 
availability of options for claimants.  It surely matters to any assessment 
of the GCCF that it was set up to operate, and did operate, parallel to 
court proceedings.  Although claimants who accepted final payments 
from the GCCF agreed not to pursue claims against BP and other 
potentially liable parties, they were permitted simultaneously to assert 
 
 9. See generally Linda Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound:  The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as 
a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819 (2011). 
 10. The GCCF’s two-track system of emergency and final payments was perhaps adopted in 
part out of recognition of the need for a hybrid payment scheme of this sort. 
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legal claims against BP and other defendants.11  Of course, there are 
times when an apparent choice is merely notional, and it is possible that 
certain classes of claimants, practically speaking, had no choice but to 
accept what the GCCF was prepared to offer.  However, now that a 
tentative settlement of the consolidated litigation has been reached,12 it 
seems that many victims really did have a choice, and this fact is highly 
relevant to any assessment of whether the litigation system and the 
GCCF operated in a manner consonant with the requirements of 
procedural justice.  
IV.  JUSTICE AS ACCOUNTABILITY 
When a disaster occurs, the attainment of justice may not only 
require compensation but may also call for accountability.  The doing of 
justice, in other words, may include calling to account those responsible 
for a disaster.   
Accountability is a relational concept:  one person or entity is held 
accountable to another.13  As such, it can take different forms.  Criminal 
prosecutions and regulatory proceedings are ways of holding a person or 
entity accountable to the public.  To the extent BP faces criminal fines, 
for example, it is being punished on behalf of the citizens of the United 
States for its violation of certain prohibitions against causing 
environmental degradation.14     
Civil proceedings can be about accountability of a different sort—
accountability to particular victims.  When accountability takes this 
form, it blends together with notions of compensatory justice and 
procedural justice, even though it is distinct from both of them.  A civil 
lawsuit can be a way of holding a wrongdoer accountable to a victim and 
a way of seeing to it that compensatory justice is done.  But the two 
ideas often come apart.  Indeed, just to be annoying, I would suggest that 
whether they come apart will depend in part on issues of procedural 
justice.  It is conceivable, for example, that our procedures for enabling 
 
 11. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS, 
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY (Feb. 18, 
2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINAL_RULES.pdf. 
 12. Daniel Fisher, BP Settles With Plaintiff Lawyers, Pegs Cost at $7.8 Billion, FORBES, Mar. 
3, 2012. 
 13. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38, 40 (2000) 
(accountability is a relational concept that imposes a “duty to give account for one’s actions to some 
other person or body”). 
 14. See David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone:  The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental 
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011). 
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victims of a disaster to pursue claims against responsible parties will 
allow for a responsibility-based notion of compensatory justice to be 
done, yet not give victims a basis for feeling satisfied that the person or 
entity paying the compensation has been held accountable to them.  
Indeed, this is a familiar feature of, and complaint about, ordinary civil 
litigation that results in quick settlements where there is little process, no 
admission of fault, and the like.  In such cases, claimants are sometimes 
left feeling that the process has failed them precisely by denying them an 
opportunity to have defendants held accountable to them.    
Notice also that accountability can take different forms and can be 
addressed to different actors with different sorts of connections to a 
disaster.  When it comes to accountability for a catastrophic oil spill, we 
will naturally and correctly focus on an entity such as BP.  But we might 
also suppose that, in justice, there should be some form of governmental 
accountability.15  This might be true, for example, if there is evidence of 
lax regulation or an inadequate response to a disaster.  In principle, 
justice as accountability might even call for the imposition of liability on 
governments for some portion of victims’ losses.  It might also, or in the 
alternative, call for political accountability at the ballot box.  
One might even suppose that there must be accountability for 
persons who were only indirectly involved in the disaster.  It might be 
argued, for example, that every competent adult American is weakly 
complicit in the Deepwater Horizon spill by virtue of our intemperate 
energy consumption habits and, on this basis, should be held accountable 
for it.  Of course, it does not follow that each of us should be criminally 
punished or held liable to victims of the spill.  Instead, justice might 
require a different form of accountability.  It might require us actively to 
support policies designed to curb our consumption of fossil fuels, or that 
promote the restoration of natural resources in afflicted areas.16  
IV.  COMPARATIVE JUSTICE 
One of the most interesting and difficult aspects of justice has to do 
with how to frame our inquiries into justice.  As Ken Feinberg has often 
noted, to think about justice in connection the Deepwater Horizon Spill 
invites comparisons with the treatment of those injured in the 9/11 
 
 15. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 2041, 2043-46.  
 16. Cf. Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365, 
377-80 (2004) (outlining a notion of “political responsibility” by which persons who participate in 
systems that perpetuate certain structural injustices have reason to take steps to ameliorate those 
injustices). 
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attacks, those injured by Hurricane Katrina, and those injured in the 
Oklahoma City bombing.17  Suppose we conclude that the 9/11 Fund did 
right by eligible claimants as a matter of compensatory and procedural 
justice.  Did it thereby do wrong as to the victims of the Oklahoma City 
bombing?  Does the creation of the GCCF, given the very different sort 
of response to Katrina, create an injustice as to the victims of Katrina?  
Some of the most difficult issues of justice raised by disasters are in the 
end questions about the consistency with which we respond to them.  
Insofar as this sort of inconsistency is itself an injustice, it may call for 
more uniform protocols of response.  To be sure, some such protocols 
are already in place (though whether they are adequate is a different 
question).  They include the provision of disaster relief through agencies 
such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”),18 and the 
availability, in principle, of the tort system to all person with colorable 
claims against allegedly responsible wrongdoers.  It is at least 
conceivable, however, that comparative justice requires the 
establishment of a set of national compensation protocols for disaster 
victims. 
  
 
 17. 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 78 (2004).   
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 5121-5207 (1988). 
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